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When it comes to explaining human thought and behavior, the possibility that
heredity plays any role at all still has the power to shock. To acknowledge human
nature, many think, is to endorse racism, sexism, war, greed, genocide, nihilism,
reactionary politics, and neglect of children and the disadvantaged. Any claim that
the mind has an innate organization strikes people not as a hypothesis that might
be incorrect but as a thought it is immoral to think.
Stephen Pinker, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN
NATURE 1

I was apprehensive when asked [to direct this project analyzing the current
status and implications of work in the area of behavioral genetics] . . . [mostly]
because the subject has an ugly history . . . [over time, however, it] became clear
that this investigation, believed to be the first of its kind, is necessary if we want to
avoid the mistakes of the past, make an impartial assessment of the emerging
scientific evidence, and reach valid moral and legal conclusions about the potential
applications of the research.
Bob Hepple, Queen’s Counsel, Genetics and Human Behavior: The Ethical
Context, Nuffield Council on Bioethics2
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1 STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE, at Preface viii
(Viking 2002).
2 Bob Hepple, QC, Preface of Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetics & Human Behavior: The
Ethical Context (2002) [hereinafter Genetics & Human Behavior].
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In a lecture delivered in 1928 before The New York Academy of Medicine
entitled What Medicine Can Do for Law, Benjamin Cardozo explained to his nonlegal audience the rule that all modern lawyers know, that the law is to be derived
from facts and not “by a process of deduction from metaphysical principles of
unvarying validity.”3 And, he suggested, in areas related to science, it would
necessarily be the scientists who would provide those facts: “Let the facts be
known as they are,” Cardozo said, “and the law will sprout from the seeds and turn
its branches toward the light.”4 Then, in a discussion that was extraordinarily if not
unimaginably prescient, Cardozo focused his remarks on the body of scientific
facts that he believed would ultimately have the most significant impact on the law,
the then-nascent field of human biochemistry.5 He prophesied that developments in
this field—while certainly hypothetical in his time—“a century or less from now”6
would cause “fundamental change”7 in those legal doctrines that relied upon the
truth of “the creed that virtue and vice” are “spiritual essences,” or, as Socrates
said, that “a good soul will by its excellence render the body as perfect as can be.”8
Most conspicuously, Cardozo believed, the field of biochemistry would
revolutionize the criminal law, whose theories of punishment other than
“vengeance”9 are most deeply dependent upon this proposition, and most obviously
disdainful of the competing notions that “vice and virtue” are environmentally or
biologically determined.10 He suggested, for example, that we would come to learn
from science that “the heavy hand of doom was on [the criminal’s] head from the
beginning,” and thus that “[t]he sin, in truth, is ours—the sin of a penal system that
leaves the victim to his fate when the course that he is going is written down so
plainly in the files of the courts and the stigmata of mind and body.”11 At the same
3 Benjamin N. Cardozo, Chief Justice, Court of Appeals, State of New York, What Medicine Can
Do for Law, The Anniversary Discourse, The New York Academy of Medicine, Nov. 1, 1928, at 6
(Harper & Brothers 1930) [hereinafter Cardozo].
4 Id. at 8.
5 Cardozo described this field as consisting primarily of “researches . . . into the operations of the
ductless glands,” which at the time were “still in the stage of speculation or hypothesis.” Id. at 12.
Despite its status as a hypothesis, Cardozo obviously accepted that some truth ultimately would come
out of the view that “the internal secretions with their influence upon brain and nervous system, as well
as every other part of the body-corporation, as essentially blood-circulating chemical substances, have
been discovered the real governors and arbiters of instincts and dispositions, emotions and reactions,
characters and temperaments, good and bad.” Id. at 12-13.
6 Id. at 21-22.
7 Id. at 9.
8 Cardozo, supra note 3, at 13 (quoting Socrates from Plato’s Republic). Cardozo clearly believed
some in this creed himself, as he suggested that one could readily accept the inevitability of some
substantial transformation in the law based upon developments in these scientific fields “without
acceptance of the creed that virtue and vice are not spiritual essences, but high-sounding synonyms for
the hormones of the body.” Id. at 13-14. In other words, he rejected the prospect as unlikely that
science would ever prove that “virtue and vice” were exclusively the result of “the hormones of the
body,” just as he rejected “the precept that [these traits] are the products solely of environment.” Id. at
14.
9 Id. at 16 (using the word “vengeance” synonymously with its more contemporary iteration,
“retribution”).
10 Id. at 8.
11 Id. at 20.
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time, Cardozo rejected the prospect that biochemists would ever prove that “virtue
and vice are [complete] synonyms for spontaneous secretions”—there was still
something to be said for the soul—and Cardozo imagined that science ultimately
would teach us that an individual’s morality or capacity for choice results from the
interaction of these forces.12
* * *
As we reflect on the Justice’s musings just about “one hundred years or less”
later, it is impossible not to recognize all that he got right, and how tainted by
history these truths are nonetheless. Biochemistry, neurology, psychiatry,
psychology, and the Human Genome Project (HGP) have combined with other
disciplines and developments to reveal the important relationship between genes
on the one hand, and biological and socially constructed environmental influences
on the other; the effect of development over time; and the interactions of geneenvironment-development relationships on an individual’s expression of (among
other things) behavioral traits such as intelligence, personality, behavior, and sexual
orientation.13 And geneticists working on group-based differences primarily in
disease patterns but also increasingly in the expression of behavioral traits are
beginning to discuss the significance of these same relationships to their work.14 In
part because of these legitimate developments, it is no longer heretical to note that
the tabula rasa and individual free will are cultural fictions rather than scientific
fact; nor is it unusual to find the law and other societal institutions grappling with
the implications of these fictions for doctrine and policy. At the same time,
individuals and groups have used bad science throughout modern history to support

12

Cardozo, supra note 3, at 12-15.
See, e.g., Avshalom Caspi et al., Influence of Life Stress on Depression: Moderation by a
Polymorphism in the 5-HTT Gene, 301 SCIENCE 386 (2003) (stressful life events are more likely to
produce depression in persons with the less active short 5HTTLPR allele than those with the long
allele); Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297
SCIENCE 851 (2002) (abuse in childhood is more likely to produce antisocial behavior in men with the
less active MAOA-uVNTR alleles than those with more active alleles). See generally Genetics and
Human Behavior, supra note 2, at Parts II (scientific background) and III (reviews of the evidence).
14 See, e.g., Anne L. Taylor et al., Combination of Isosorbide Dinitrate and Hydralazine in Blacks
with Heart Failure, 351 THE NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 2049 (2004) (describing results of their study
demonstrating that the combination of “isosorbide dinatrate plus hydralazine . . . in addition to standard
therapy for heart failure” is “efficacious and increases survival among black patients with advanced
heart failure” where the same treatment was not generally successful in white patients); Redford B.
Williams et al., Central Nervous System Serotonin Function and Cardiovascular Responses to Stress, 63
PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 300 (2001) (describing the effect of the 5HTTLPR long allele—related to
neurochemical/serotonin function—on reactivity to stress, noting the long allele is more frequent in
African populations and could account for increased cardiovascular disease risk in African-Americans;
describing the variability of effects of this allele on brain serotonin levels among men and women,
blacks and whites; noting its relationship to “several facets of the personality dimension of neuroticism
(including anxiety, angry hostility, depression, and impulsiveness)”; and emphasizing the significance of
environmental factors in the expression of the related genetic predispositions).
13
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discrimination against individuals, racial groups, and the sexes.15 (Cardozo’s
speech was itself given in the heyday of the Eugenics Movement.) These abuses of
science have deeply tainted our ability to talk openly about the new science,
especially as it begins to suggest the existence of differences among sub-groups in
the population with respect to genetic potential for expressing certain kinds of
intelligence and antisocial behavior. Indeed, it is inevitable that these latest
developments will be viewed by many either as old (racist, sexist, classist) sheep in
new clothing, or as scientifically legitimate but still too dangerous to touch because
of the likelihood that they will be misused to justify existing or new forms of
discrimination.16
Harvard University President Lawrence H. Summers thus ought to have
known better when he allowed himself casually to suggest that “a ‘much higher
fraction of married men’ than married women are willing to work 80-hour weeks in
order to attain ‘high powered’ jobs” and that “in the special case of science and
engineering, there are issues of intrinsic aptitude, and particularly of the variability
of aptitude; and that those considerations are reinforced by what are in fact lesser
factors involving socialization and continuing discrimination.”17 Whatever he
meant to say, these remarks, given to a conference of economists in February 2005,
have been widely read as signifying his belief that he “believes women are
intellectually inferior to men.”18 The fact that Summers is the President of
15

“Science” was used beginning primarily in the mid-1800s to support the perpetuation of slavery in the
United States; to resist the recognition of married women’s rights to own property and to vote; and to
rationalize the Eugenics Movement which (among other things) resulted in hundreds of thousands of
forced sterilizations in the United States and culminated in the Holocaust. Throughout this essay, I refer
to this use of science as “bad science” and contrast it with the new “good” science. Robert CookDeegan explains that “bad science” in this context “is shorthand for a contrast between science that
failed to acknowledge the social roots of many distinctions among groups of people, or the role of
social, environmental, and historical factors.” E-mail from Robert Cook-Deegan, Director of Duke
University’s Center for Genome Ethics, Law, and Policy, to Author (March 25, 2005, 01:11 EST) (on
file with author). The basis for the distinction I make is thus a political and methodological one: The
so-called scientific rationalizations for slavery and the Eugenics Movement were nothing of the sort;
rather, they were convenient arguments in support of discriminatory policies, imagined out of whole
cloth and cloaked in the mantle of science as a way to reinforce their credibility. Cook-Deegan further
explained:
They were to modern genetics much like notions of “primitive,” and categorization of
“inferior” and “superior” groups seem impoverished to modern anthropology, or
irreducible particles to modern physics. In contrast, and however politic or impolitic their
conception, reputable scientific studies today are the product of more analysis and peer
review, and a more rigorous social process for producing “reliable knowledge.” . . . This
does not mean that their conclusions will always withstand the test of time and additional
experimentation, but it does mean that we can have more confidence about the results
than was warranted in the previous historical period . . . . Science remains a social
process subject to error; but it is also more professional and rigorous than it used to be.
Id.
16 See, e.g., supra notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text (providing author Steven Pinker and Queen’s
Counsel Bob Hepple’s struggle with this dilemma in the area of behavioral genomics generally); see
also JENNY REARDON, RACE TO THE FINISH: IDENTITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF GENOMICS 116 (2005) (exploring the explosiveness of the new conversation about race and genetics).
17 Sara Rimer & Patrick D. Healy, Summers Releases Controversial Transcript, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, February 18, 2005, at A1.
18 See, e.g., id.
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Harvard—symbolically, the leader of the most publicly prestigious intellectual
institution in the country—delivered a double whammy to supporters of gender
equality: It assured that his words would be heard far and wide, and that they would
provide fodder to their otherwise starving opponents. In this regard, one university
dean went so far as to describe his remarks as generating an “intellectual
tsunami.”19 Moreover, given that Summers is at least perceived to be less-thanfully committed to rectifying patterns of discrimination on Harvard’s faculty,20 his
words rekindled the concern that underlies this area generally, namely, that still
today some of our most important leaders are sexist (and racist and classist), and
even those who are not nevertheless may be inclined for practical reasons to use the
new science to excuse an abdication of leadership on issues of equality. It’s no
one’s fault if it is in everyone’s genes.
It is undoubtedly the case that people—even publicly important people—will
continue to make the same mistake Summers made, and talk too casually about
group-based “intrinsic” and “innate” differences. It is also more likely than not that
their words will trigger similar uproars and quieter vindications. The answer to this
problem is not, however, to suppress the work of legitimate scientists, or to censor
those who would analyze the implications of their research and discoveries. Rather,
it is to ensure that the discourse about the scientific “facts” is both historically
sensitive and genetically literate; there is simply no room here for sloppy
conversation. While the ground is clearly treacherous, understanding the ways and
extent to which environmental factors trigger and suppress genetic predispositions
is necessary for our ability to evaluate fully the related aspects of institutional
structures, policies, and doctrines. As I will suggest below, it is also necessary to
the construction of a different equality paradigm that can (in Justice Cardozo’s
words) “sprout from the seeds” of these scientific facts, rather than from ultimately
fictitious “metaphysical principles of unvarying validity.”
A. HISTORICAL SENSITIVITY
It is a fact that bad science has been used throughout history to support
discrimination against women, and in this country also against African-Americans.
In both instances, the prejudicial policies that emanated from that discrimination
served to perpetuate the dominance of primarily propertied white men in society’s
most important institutions, and to entrench the deeply harmful conditions that
resulted for these two groups. While prejudicial policies have been formally
repudiated, their underlying scientific rationales were so ingrained in the culture
that their legacy continues today (despite their repudiation also by most of the
society) to suggest the possibility that women and African-Americans may be
intellectually inferior and otherwise less likely to be found doing “high (brain)
19 Sam Dillon & Sara Rimer, No Break in the Storm Over Harvard President’s Words, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, January 19, 2005, at A14 (quoting Denice D. Denton, Dean of Engineering at the
University of Washington).
20 Id.
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powered” work. In the case of women specifically, the historical notions that
smaller brain size and female hormones either preclude our capacity for this work,
or else make it much less likely that we will achieve as often at the highest levels,
have yet to be buried completely.21 Therefore, whenever science appears to
suggest the existence of new evidence to support these old notions, it is
understandable and indeed inevitable that the motives of its authors and purveyors
will be questioned, because a biological explanation for inequality excuses
inaction. The fact that the new science is likely to be perceived as “good” (unlike
the old “bad” science) is particularly pernicious in this regard, because this new
science is more credible.22
At the same time, because “science is always culturally contingent,” even
benignly or benevolently motivated scientific research can “reinforce [negative]
cultural assumptions.”23 The areas of scientific study that are privileged in the
academy, and funded by both public and private sources, reflect choices that
themselves are influenced by individual and institutional politics as well as
underlying cultural norms. What we choose not to study thus can assure that
scientific knowledge is less than objective and true.
Participants in any discussion of the biology of gender must appreciate this
history and its legacy. And they must integrate their substantive lessons throughout
the discussion to ensure its legitimacy and probably also its success. This means
not only nodding to history in the preface of any public remarks about new
scientific theories and evidence, but also (most importantly) using that history and
its caveats as one of the prisms through which the theories, evidence, and any
resulting implications are evaluated. In other words, in this arena, both form (as a
signal of respect and sophistication) and substance (as a methodological point) are
critical.
B. GENETIC LITERACY
As Summers explained in a letter to the Harvard faculty written in the wake
of the furor over his remarks, “[I should] have spoken differently on matters so
complex.”24 Needless to say, he was right. Genetic literacy—knowing and
conveying the fundamental principles and relevant details of the science—is
essential to any moral conversation about the biology of race and gender, both
because of the historical use of bad science to support discrimination against
disfavored groups and women, and because of the still-enormous “potential for

21 See, e.g., Amanda Ripley, Who Says A Woman Can’t Be Einstein?, TIME, March 7, 2005,
passim.
22 See, e.g., REARDON, supra note 16, at 2 (describing the reaction of some groups to the Human
Genome Diversity Project, including “some physical anthropologists [who] accused the initiative of
using twenty-first-century technology to propagate the concepts of nineteenth-century racist biology.”).
23 E-mail from Lauren Dame, Associate Director, Duke University Center for Genome Ethics, Law
& Policy (Apr. 3, 2005, 11:53 EST) (on file with author).
24 Rimer & Healy, supra note 17.
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abuse of findings in this area.”25 It is beyond the scope of this essay even to
describe (what we think we know about) differences in the biology of the male and
female brain. Nevertheless, there are a few points that are easily articulated and that
can form the basis for a genetically literate discourse on the subject.
First, there is a vast difference between the sort of theorizing and
uncontrolled experimentation that historically passed as brain science, and the
rigorous analysis and peer review that today characterizes the scientific
community’s methodology and literature in this area. Thus, while politics still
influence science, and while there is still much that we do not know about the
biology of the brain, we can have an important measure of confidence in scientific
conclusions that have survived this methodology.26 It is critical in this regard that
the new science has and will continue to afford possibilities for alleviating human
suffering that would not exist but for the willingness of the relevant communities to
risk inflammatory developments and to work through the complicated issues they
implicate.
Second, relating to the specific context of this essay, while “there are indeed
real differences between the male and the female brain” including in the
architecture of “the parts of the brain that are related to intelligence,” all indications
are as most of us expect them to be: Women working at the highest levels in the
fields of mathematics, the sciences, and elsewhere do it as well as men.27 This is
not a complete response to Summers, of course, as it fails to explain why there are
relatively few women working in the stratospheres of these fields. The possibility
that some of this disparity may be linked to genomic and/or biological differences
thus remains to be evaluated, presumably in the context of ongoing work on sex
differences in cognition. This work promises to yield a richer understanding of how
the human brain is constructed and operates, and the extent to which genes,
biology, and environmental conditions influence gender differences in these
respects.28 To the extent that Summers was correct on this point, it was wholly

25

Genetics and Human Behavior, supra note 2, at xxii.
See supra note 15 (explaining the distinction I draw throughout this essay between the “new
good science” and the “old bad science”).
27 Again, much has been written in the popular press on this subject since Lawrence Summers’
remarks. See, e.g., Ripley, supra note 21, at 52 and passim. For an example from the scientific
literature, see Doreen Kimura, Sex Differences in the Brain, SCI. AM. SPECIAL ISSUE: THE HIDDEN MIND
(2002) (Suggesting that “the effects of sex hormones on brain organization occur so early in life that
from the start the environment is acting on differently wired brains in boys and girls. Such effects make
evaluating the role of experience, independent of physiological predisposition, a difficult if not dubious
task.”); DOREEN KIMURA, SEX & COGNITION (2000) (discussing gender differences in brain structure
and cognitive abilities).
28 Some of the most recent and promising work in this area relates to the discovery that women’s
second X chromosome is not inactive as scientists once believed. According to Huntington Willard,
Director of the Institute for Genome Sciences and Policy at Duke University and co-author of a recent
study with Laura Carrel published in NATURE magazine, women’s genomes are inherently more
complex and, as a result, possibly more productive then men’s. Laura Carrel & Huntington F. Willard,
X-inactivation Profile Reveals Extensive Variability in X-linked Gene Expression in Females, 434
NATURE 400 (March 2005); see also Mark T. Ross et al., The DNA Sequence of the Human X
Chromosome, 434 NATURE 325 (March 2005).
26
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obscured by his sloppy presentation and scientifically unsupportable personal
speculation about the significance of innate differences in relation to socialization
and discrimination as factors that contribute to the gender disparities at issue. In
fact, the raging debate about the particular “dose” of each that makes a given
person is more of a political argument about functional equality than it is a
scientific one about the facts of human “nature.”29 While there is certainly
sufficient indication that socialization and discrimination play a leading if not the
most important role in the interchange, we simply do not know enough about the
gene-environment relationship in this context to settle the debate as a factual
matter.
Third, whatever innate differences are found to exist among groups that could
influence the way the brain processes information, individual genomes also will
vary so that a particular person will not necessarily express her group’s tendencies.
As explained in an important recent report on genetics and human behavior
conducted by the British Nuffield Council on Bioethics, with regard to behavioral
traits including intelligence, there is no single “gene for X”: “More than one genetic
factor usually contributes to a particular trait” and “[t]hese multiple genetic factors
may interact with each other and have different effects depending on which other
factors are present in the individual’s genotype.”30 In essence, this is the difference
between genetics and genomics, and the reason why individuals are generally more
alike than not despite generalizations about the genetic characteristics of their
subgroups.
Fourth, even where it exists, an individual or group-based genetic
predisposition generally does not provide the basis for institutions to ignore
environmental factors including discrimination. Rather, such a predisposition may
prove the significance of those factors in the expression of the relevant trait, as well
as in the development of solutions to address disparities. The Nuffield Council
report explains the interaction of genes and the environment this way:
• As well as genetic factors, many non-genetic (environmental) factors may
contribute to the manifestation of a trait.
• These environmental factors may also interact with each other.
• The genetic factors may affect which environmental factors have an effect.
(This is called gene-environment interaction.)

29 This debate is exemplified in the indirect public exchange between Lawrence Summers and
Howard Georgi, “a physics professor who has been part of a successful effort in Harvard’s physics
department to recruit more tenured women.” Rimer & Healy, supra note 17. In response to Summers’
particular suggestion that “issues of intrinsic aptitude . . . are reinforced by what are in fact lesser factors
involving socialization and continued discrimination,” Georgi stated, “It’s crazy to think that it’s an
innate difference . . . It’s socialization. We’ve trained young women to be average. We’ve trained young
men to be adventurous.” Id. The heat has been so intense on this point, that Summers himself quickly
offered a retraction, noting that “he had ‘substantially understated the impact of socialization and
discrimination’” on the disparity of women in the relevant academic disciplines. Id.
30 Genetics and Human Behavior, supra note 2, at xxii.
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• Conversely, environmental factors may affect which genetic factors have an
effect.
• Certain genetic and environmental factors may go hand in hand. (This is
called gene-environment correlation.)
• A protein may be modified after it has been produced from a gene, and this
can alter its function.
• Genes do not have continuous effect in our bodies. They may be turned on
and off, both during our overall development and within the lifetime of an
individual cell.31
While we cannot yet alter our genomes, we do have an important measure of
control over our environment. Thus, to the extent that we understand the
relationship between particular gene-environment combinations, we can begin to
conceive of environmental solutions to avoid or mediate the expression of
maladaptive predispositions and to nurture adaptive ones, in both individuals and
groups: “Genetics is not destiny.”32
C. A DIFFERENT EQUALITY
Prevailing anti-discrimination doctrine has mostly focused on affording
disadvantaged groups the right and privilege to be treated just like advantaged
groups. Under this model, where race is concerned, African-Americans and other
disfavored minorities are required to be viewed as though they were white. And
where the issue is gender, women are required to be viewed as though they were
men. Equality is thus defined according to the terms set by the advantaged
groups.33
This model, including as incorporated in equal protection doctrine, has
worked to guide policies that have themselves achieved enormous gains for both
women and minorities. To the extent that white men receive the human equivalent
of “most favored nation” status in our educational and political institutions and in
the workplace, women and minorities have received many of the benefits of that
31

See id. at xxi.
E-mail from Robert Cook-Deegan, Director of Duke University’s Center for Genome Ethics,
Law, and Policy, to Author (March 25, 2005, 01:11 EST) (on file with author). Environmental solutions
could involve the elimination of environmental forces that enable the expression of genetic
predispositions, or teaching people to mitigate the effect of those forces when they cannot be eliminated.
As Professor Redford Williams explains, “when the environment is a source of stress, it is always ideal
if one can change the environment to make it less stressful. But when this is hard or even impossible—
e.g., it's not clear that the economic, political and social upheavals that are contributing to poor health in
Central and Eastern Europe since the USSR breakup are amenable to being fixed so that the stresses
those populations face will be reduced—it may still be possible to teach people, even those who are
genetically more sensitive . . . to cope better with those stressful environments in ways that at least
reduce the harm.” E-mail from Redford Williams, Professor, Duke University, to Author (March 23,
2005, 01:54 EST) (on file with author).
33 See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
COMMENTARY 101-102 (2nd ed. 1998) (discussing the theory of formal equality upon which the
Supreme Court’s gender equality cases are based, including the autonomy principle which requires that
“each woman be given the opportunity to show eligibility for the desired benefit on the same basis as
men.”).
32
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status where they can show that they are otherwise similarly situated. The fact that
this conception of equality has not (yet) been entirely successful does not diminish
its significance or continued value. And, contrary to Lawrence Summers’
suggestion, it also does not mean that we should turn primarily to “innate
differences” to explain the remaining disparities.34
At the same time, just as advances in genomic medicine have shown that
equal treatment for every individual (regardless of gender or continent of historical
origin) may not mean prescribing drugs that were developed and determined to be
efficacious based on a population study that included primarily white men between
the ages of 20 and 50, so too it could be that equality for women in education, the
workplace, and elsewhere may not always mean the right and privilege to conform
to the prevailing male construct. Instead, just as medicine is moving toward the
development of drugs that will be tailored to genomic differences, other institutions
might tailor their structures to reflect the fact that environmental stimuli and
circumstances sometimes differently affect the ability of men and women to
succeed. As one researcher has urged, because “boys and girls are innately
different” it is necessary to “change the environment so differences don’t become
limitations.”35 This alternative model of equality would not require that institutions
afford women the same opportunities and circumstances as men, but rather that
they afford both the particular environment that would allow each to succeed to the
same extent.36
Some institutions, academics, and policymakers have already begun to
conceive and implement structural reforms in accordance with a version of this
idea. Thus, for example, researchers are re-imagining same-sex elementary
education, not as a way to assure that girls/boys are not distracted by each other and
the peer pressures that are reflected in that dynamic, but as a way to achieve better
rates of efficiency and success for both groups in light of what are apparently
different maturation rates of some brain functions.37 And some universities and
corporations (including law firms) are reevaluating their established expectations

34 See Rimer & Healy, supra note 17 (reporting on Summers’ remarks particularly concerning his
view that innate differences may be predominantly responsible for the gender disparity found on
academic faculties in the sciences, with “socialization and continuing discrimination” as “lesser factors”
in the equation).
35 Ripley, supra note 21, at 56 (describing the argument of Leonard Sax, author of the book WHY
GENDER MATTERS (2005)).
36 Gender law theory presumably would consider this model to fall within claims for “substantive”
rather than “formal” equality. See, e.g., BARTLETT AND HARRIS, supra note 34, at 261-262 (discussing
substantive equality generally), and at 311-411 (exploring arguments to “eliminat[e] the disadvantages
of women’s differences, and “sex-linked average differences”).
37 Ripley, supra note 21, at 56. Research indicates that “most parts of the brain mature faster in
girls” although “some areas mature faster in boys.” Id. at 55. “Specifically, some of the regions
involved in mechanical reasoning, visual targeting and spacial reasoning appeared to mature four to
eight years earlier in boys. The parts that handle verbal fluency, handwriting and recognizing familiar
faces matured several years earlier in girls.” Id. It is not known whether these physiological differences
in development are entirely the result of “innate” or genomic blueprints, or of the interaction between
innate predispositions and environmental influences. Nevertheless, they are apparently very much
biological in nature by the time they are studied by neurologists.
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and incentive structures to reflect the fact that women, who clearly can do “high
(brain) power” work and whose contributions are extremely valuable in these
respects, sometimes are drawn (apparently differently than men and for as yet
undeciphered reasons) away from the traditional career track when they are raising
children.38
It is obviously beyond the scope of this essay for me to do more than describe
the rough contours of an outcome-based model of equality. Nevertheless, reenvisioning anti-discrimination doctrine in the law to conform to these contours has
some attractive and important features, and thus, I hope it can engender useful
discussion about its details and viability. For example, to the extent that it is true
that boys and girls, men and women, who are otherwise similarly-situated
intellectually are nevertheless different in terms of their capacity to respond, or are
at different maturation points, or differ in their sensitivities to particular
environmental contexts, this model would eliminate an inherently (and ironically)
discriminatory feature of the prevailing paradigm which treats everyone the same.
It also would be truer to the facts than this paradigm, which is based on the twin
legal fictions that women and men are the precisely same other than in their
(in)ability to gestate, and that all other differences are merely the result of sociallyconstructed stereotype. In this way, it would also be truer to legal tradition, which,
as Justice Cardozo suggested, generally is based in the facts. While these twin
fictions are essential to protecting the opportunity for gender parity under existing
law, the danger inherent in their rejection would be much less apparent in a
different jurisprudential setting that nevertheless accomplished the same (if not
better) ends.
At the same time, and even in its rough state, this model has important
deficiencies. Embracing a “vive la différence” approach to equal protection
doctrine undoubtedly will be viewed by many as all expressions of gender
difference are—see the reaction to Lawrence Summers’ remarks—as either the
product of a conscious effort once again to use science to abandon progress toward
real equality, or as risking a return to the days where women were primarily
encouraged to be homemakers. Additionally, substantial questions will arise about
the practical, political, and economic feasibility of its implementation. What would
it require, for example, to restructure public elementary education to reflect
38 This particular kind of reform has been criticized by those who believe that gender differences
are predominantly the result of socialization: If we would just treat little girls and women the way we
treat men, both groups would have the same tendencies one way or the other, and thus such changes
would either not be necessary at all or they would equally desired (for intellectual reasons) by both. The
contrary argument—which I prefer—is that such reforms make sense so long as they do not inhibit
women who want to from progressing according to a different (e.g., the prevailing male) paradigm. I
personally suspect that women’s behavioral patterns in these respects are the result of a complex
interaction of genetic predispositions and environmental factors including socialization, which is why I
include them in this set of illustrations. If I am right, an institutional model that recognizes the role that
biology plays in the equation is most likely to result in an appropriately diverse and successful
workforce. Even if I am incorrect, however, there is no real-world merit (or moral principle, for that
matter) to giving women who are deeply committed as a result of socialization both to raising their
children and to succeeding in the workplace only an “either/or” solution.
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inherent learning differences in boys and girls so that by high school both groups
were equally proficient in social and verbal skills as well as in math? And what
would it require to redesign incentives and the workplace environment to reflect
gender differences in adaptability so that both men and women could be equally
successful? While the necessary economic incentives (and thus the political will)
clearly exist to develop designer drugs, it is questionable whether the same could
be had for fundamental cultural and institutional reforms.
However difficult these questions, this alternative model is an essential part
of the discourse about the biology of gender. Advances in neuroscience, genetics,
and genomics will continue to test the intellectual integrity of the prevailing
paradigm and its dependence on the notion that men and women are the same.39 At
the very least, the alternative allows for its objective—continued progress toward
substantive equality—to remain a central commitment even as this challenge is
engaged, so that its proponents are not faced with the false choice either of
abandoning the discussion or the promise of equal protection. At best, it provides
the rough outlines for a “designer equality” that may better fit the facts, and thus
the development of the soundest legal doctrine.
* * *
At the time of their respective remarks, Justice Cardozo and President
Summers had quite a bit in common. They were both important public intellectuals
whose words had the power to encourage or retard progress toward justice. They
were both sufficiently interested in “spontaneous secretions” or “intrinsic aptitude”
that they bothered to give speeches on the subject. And, in a rough way, they were
both correct that these likely would combine with other influences to make the
person who she is. Ultimately, it is history and knowledge that distinguishes the
two men and the value of their words. Since Cardozo opined that “the course that [a
person] is going is written down so plainly in . . . the stigmata of mind and body,”
bad science has been used to rationalize terrible discriminations, and good science
has shown how important it is to speak carefully and with relevant sophistication
on “matters so complex” as the biology of the human brain. The alchemy of a
moral discourse on the biology of gender in particular requires a healthy dose of
historical sensitivity and genetic literacy, as well as an ongoing commitment to
equality.
One final note. My colleague James Boyle is fond of saying that there is no
such thing as a new idea. As he is quick to acknowledge, this itself was not his
idea; and so too the things I have written in this essay are not new. The literature in
related disciplines is both implicitly and explicitly redundant regarding the need for
historical sensitivity when discussing group-based biological difference. Similarly,

39 See generally EXPLORING THE BIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMAN HEALTH: DOES SEX
MATTER? (Theresa M. Wizemann & Mary-Lou Pardue eds., 2001).
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whenever complicated scientific issues are mutilated in the public discourse, there
is an outcry for more careful conversation. And certainly others have critiqued the
prevailing view of formal equality, and thoughtfully considered different
approaches. Nevertheless, what I hope at least to have reinforced is that when the
conversation about the biology of gender (or race) takes place, it can only be
successful in circumstances where the participants embrace these principles.

